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EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY THROUGH
LOCAL MEASURED SERVICE REVISITED
Dale E. Lehman
Jqbal A. M emon
In a recent article, Brown and Norgaard (B&N, 1991) examine the important issue of local
telephone service pricing, specifically the des1rabihty of local measured service (LMS) as an alternative to flat-rate local service. They sec the primary advantage of LMS as the ehminat1on of the
cross-subsidy of heavy users by light users. Unfortunately, thelf study 1s plagued v.ith me1hodo log1cal problems, which have led them to overstate the size of the cross-subsidy and to co nclude that
light users generally subsidize heavy users: the reverse of the true d1rec11on 1 Given these errors, II 1s
difficult 10 understand the dynamics of market evoluuon and regulatory pressures that current!)
exist. It is precisely the heavy users who seek altem auve networks, facih11es, and pricing structures.
This is because it is the heavy users who are bearing the brunt of the cross-subsidy, not rece1\'ing 11.
This is primarily true for heavy business users, but as technology advances II 1s increasingl) true
for heavy residential users as well. We will clarify the methodological errors in B& and examine
the true subsidy flows that result from ex1s11ng telephone pricing structures It 1s against this background that we will examine the potenual role of LMS in promoung eff1c1ency and equity m telephone pricing.
Following the break-up of AT&T in 1984, concern has been voiced w11h respect to the potential increase in residential rates as the 1rad111onal cross-subs1d1za11on of local service by toll service
becomes unsustainable in a compe1111ve environment This increase in res1den11al rates has been
enhanced as a result o f the reducuo n by the FCC of the subsidy, w hich AT&T, as a monopoly, was
able (and required) to provide res1den11al customers by overcharging of long distance calls. The
FCC has followed a deliberate policy o f rate restructuring, using flat-rate monthly subscriber hne
charges to reduce usage-sens 111ve cam er access charges that provided the subsidy With open competition between AT&T, Sprint, and other long distance came rs, there 1s fu rther dov. nward pressure
on long distance prices, hence the pressure for local rates to rise furt her The a1trac11veness of private networks and bypass fac1h11es for heavy users contributes 10 this pressure. It 1s w11hin the context of continuing downward pressure on usage-sens111ve long distance prices that LMS should be
investigated.
B& propose substituting LMS for flat-rate pricing of local calls to gain the efficiencies of
cos!•based pricing. Most countries use LMS, while fl at-rate pricing 1s the pracuce in most of the
Umted States and LMS 1s strongly resisted by state regulators and their cons111uenc1es, as noted by
B&N. Cost-based pricing of local calls, c laim B& , would remove inefficient overuse of local service_. It would further enhance equ11y, they claim, by removing the existing subsidy of heavy users
by hght users. However, their methodology 1s flawed m fo ur important respects: (I) they omit some
r~cent de.velopments in the efficiency a nalysis o f LMS, (2) the cross-subsidy test they use 1s inconsistent with economic theory-they use fully allocated costs rather than increm ental costs to tes t for
cross-subsidy; (3) they choose a misleading leve l of aggregation to analyze the usage d1stnbu11on
acros~ cu~tome~s; a~d (4) they isolate local calls fro m the rest o f the customer-consumption profile,
resulting _m their misrepresentatio n of the true subsidy flow between light and heavy users. In the
next secuon, we su~marize_B& 's main points. The third secllon prov ides ou r criuque of their
met?odology. The fmal secuon reexamines the effic iency and equ11y pro perties o f LMS, after correction of the methodological faults.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE B&N STUDY
b

h 1. Un~er fla'.•rate pricing of local calls, the marginal cost of a call is positive ($0.10/minute)
ut t e marginal price to the customer is zero.

b 2·
a result, so~e will use the phone inefficiently, and those making more than the average
num er O ocal calls will be cross-subsidized by those with less than average usage.
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3. Optimal pncmg of local calls would be the rate schedule that matches individu I Ir
preferences (i.e., d1stribu11on of tastes for telephone usage) wuh ind1v1dual expenditures a~d
the local exchange earners to cover costs. LMS 1s such a pncmg scheme.
4 Measurement costs under LMS arc l '!f of the S0.10 1call marginal cost, and so are inconsequential
5 Heav} local service users make far more and longer calls than light users, yielding the
result that hght local users are subsidizing heavv local users.
6 As a result, LMS can either be based on frequency or length of calls. Approximately 72%
of users would have lower rates under revenue-neutral L'.\4S

CRITIQUE OF THE B&N TUDY

Recent research has raised some important doubLs about the convenllonal wisdom that
L'.\-1S 1s more cftic1ent than flat-rate pricing. A recent Rand Corpora11on report provides a detailed
case stud) of the 1mplemcn1a11on of LMS Park and Mitchell (P&.M, 1987) argue that the demand
for local telephone calls vanes substan11alh w llhm feasible 11mc-of-dav pncmg penods, while most
of the costs arc capacll) costs that depend onl) on pcak-pcnod usage LMS 1s unlikely to increase
economic effic1cncv to the extent wggcstcd b) thcor). The thcore11cal 1>.elfarc gains from peak-load
pncing arc largely d1ss1pa1cd bv the mtrapenod vana11on in usage that applies peak charges at many
limes when the network 1s not bemg used 10 peak capac11v Further. P&M cne measurement costs
sigmficantlv in excess of those used b) B&.-; and claim that the conunuing decline in capac11y costs
makes LMS even less anrac11ve for 11s effic1enc) properties. \Vhile the Rand report has been contested, the methodolog1cal point 1s both vahd and important. Prac11cal 1mplcmenta11on of LMS will
not yield the 1heorct1cal eff1c1enc) gains claimed and ma) not, 1eld efficiency gains at all.
A second theorc11cal development pertinent to the B&. stud:,, concerns their conclusmn that
72<:i: of users would have lower bills under revenue-neutral LMS than under flat-rate pricing. A
subs1an11al body of research indicates that customers are rc11ccnt about voluntanl) subscnbmg to
LMS, in spite of the lower bills that II offers E:.vcn 1f consumer' s surplus gain 1s the cntenon for
subscnp11on dcc1s1ons, a suhs1an11al por11on of cus!Qmcrs do not subscnbe 10 LMS when theory
suggests the} 1>.ould be belier off 10 do so. Recent studies (e.g., Tram, 1991) mdicate that flat-rate
pncing possesses in\urance propcrucs relative 10 LMS, and that these arc relevant to efficiency
(Kndel, Lehman. and Weisman, 1990). LMS provides a bill that vanes according to uncertain
usage, while flat-rate bills arc mvanant 10 this uncertain!}.
2. 86.. ·s cross-subs1d, test 1s incorrect A service 1s said to cross-subsidize another if its
pncc 1s greater than the stani alone cost. A service 1s said 10 be cross-subs1d1zed 1f 11s price 1s less
than the incremental cost. Pnces between incremental cost and stand alone cost are determined to
he --subsidy free" (e.g., Brown and Sible}. 1986) B&. 's use of cross-subsidy between customers
rather than between services 1s somewhat novel· Economists would say that users of a subsid1Z1ng
(subs1d1zed) service arc subsidmng (subsidized by) users of other services The appropnate teSI of
cross-subsidy for a specific customer class would then be: ls the total revenue from that customer
class bet1>.ecn the incremental cost of serving that customer class and their stand alone cost?
B& use the fully allocated cost of SO.JO call to determine the cross-subsidy. But, fully allo·
cated cost has nothing to do with cnhcr incremental cost or stand alone cost. Fully allocated coSI
depends on arbitrary allocallon of Joint costs Economic theory 1s clear on the irrelevance of allo•
cated cost for the dcterminauon of cross-subsidy (Tcmin, 1989, Berg and Weisman, 1991). .
It is clear that the marginal cost of a local call 1s less than its fully allocated cost. Estimates
of marginal cost of local calb are in the range of under $0.01/mmute, even. for peak usage, and in
the range of S0.024 'call setup dunng peak penods.' Further, the data contained in B&N 's Table.,;
are mconsistent w11h the text. For example 1f the number of calls/month 1s correct, then the top 5 •
of the calls for March s hould have produc~d 9 928 minutes/ month (584 x 17 minutes/call) and not
2,653 minutes/month as reported in the table.• This holds true for the remaining five rows of th c
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table. Jn addition, the mmutes/month cost ($26.53 in the first row) appears to have been based on
an arbitrary figure of $0.01/minute, the rationale for which has not been discussed m the paper.
After correcting these mistakes, the correct replacement for Table 1, based on margmal costs rather
than fully allocated costs, 1s as follows:

TABLE I
TELEPHONE USE DURJNG MARCH (HIGHEST) AND JANUARY
(LOWESn, 1984 NEW YORK TELEPHONE RANDOM SAMPLE OF 396 USERS
Category

Calls/
Month

Cost
($)

Minutes/
Month

Cost

Total Cost

(SJ

(S)

March
Highest 5%
Lowest 5%
Average

156(584)'
21(8)
160(158)

3.74(58.4)
0.50( 0.8)
3.84(15.8)

2653
32
800

26.53
0.32
8.00

30 27(84.93)
0.82( 112)
11.84(23.8 )

January
Highest 5%
Lowest 5%
Average

125(462)
15(6)
123(123)

3.00(46.2)
0.36( 0.6)
2.95(12.3)

2130
22
615

21 30
0.22
6.15

24 30(67.5 )
0.58( 0.82)
9. 10(18.45)

"The values 10 parentheses are those reported by B&N M10utes'Month and corrcspondtng Cost columns con1am B& values as well.

II is obvious from the last column that the cross-subsidy that B&N claim flows from light
users 10 heavy users is actually much smaller (Jess than hall) than reported b) them.
3. B&N provide a m1sleadmg vie" of subsidies between customer classes by focusmg on
one service 10 the exclusion of others m a pamcular customer's consump11on basket. There 1s no
doubt that local usage is highly skewed and that the margmal price under flat-rate pricmg (zero) 1s
less than 11s margmal cost (something greater than zero) However, customers also consume long
distance services and access Imes, among a variety of other services Many of these services are
priced above margmal cost. If our 101en1 1s 10 determine the cross-subsidies between customer
classes, then we must compare the total revenues associated w11h such customers 10 rela11on 10 the
costs associated with servmg them. This requires analysis of the en11re consumption bundle of customers, not JUSI their local usage. We a11emp1 a crude approx1ma11on of this analysis here.
Table 1 shows the cost breakdown (based on margmal cost) for local usage for the highest
5%, lowest 5%, and average customers. In Table 2 we expand 1h1s view 10 mclude long distance
usage.• We do not have a combined local/long distance usage data set, so we assume that the heaviest long distance users are also the heaviest local users. To the extent that the two groups are not
comcident, heavy local users are being subs1d1zed under flat-rate pricing wt1hou1 offsenmg payments for long distance services. However, the size of this subsidy 1s small, relative 10 the subsidy
borne by heavy long distance users. We estimate the dis1nbu11on of long distance usage by the
Pavarim distribution, which is commonly used 10 approximate telephone usage d1s1n butions.'
The picture that emerges is qu11e clear: the subsidy B&N find for local usage is more than
swamped by including access and long distance usage.
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TABLE2
RESIDENTIAL USER CROSS-SUBSIDIES

ervice

C ustomer
Group

Month)}
lsage

l\1ootbly
Re, eoues

(SJ

Local
U!>age

Top5%
Lowe.st 5%
Average

265.~ min mo
32
800

0 00
0.00
0.00

Longdistance
lJs.ige (I)

Top5"c
l..o"'e" 5%

2058 min mo

Longdistance
Usage (2)

Top 5'1
l..ov.c,t 5'1
Average

2058 min mo

Average

0
63

0
63

Monthly
Cost
(SJ

Monthly
Subsidy
Flow
($)

26.53
0.32
8.00

-26.53
-0.32
-8.00

343.69
000
10 52

28195 ·
0.00
8.63 ·

61.74
0.00
1.89

34l.69

16464··
000
5.04"

0.00

10.52

17905
000
5.48

• Compu1ed using S0.137 as the incremenlJI cost per minute
• ' Computed using SO OH as 1he 1r.·:remen1al cost per minute. (801h above es11ma1es are given m Crandall (1991)
and are provided here for scns11iv1I} analysis )
Sources Crandall (I 991) and Organization for Economic Coopcrauon and Development (OECD, I990).

It 1s evident that heav) residcnual users are subsidizing hght res1den11al users and not the
reverse 1

4 B&: 's level of customer aggregauon (top 5'1, bottom 5'1 for res1dent1al users) 1s misleading-telephone usage 1s far more skewed than that I For example, recent NY EX data show
that the top 0.5c( of customer accounts yield 36% of total long distance usage. In fact, the top
0.02'1 yield l 7o/, of total long distance usage. B&N' s l',ew York Telephone data show the top 5%
of customers yielding about 20'1 of the local usage (measured in calls month- if minutes month
arc used, then the figure 1s closer 10 70<:t). This data is not directly comparable due to different 11me
periods, different samples, different customer classes (res1den11al vs. business), and, most 1mpor1antly, different serv ices (long distance vs. local usage). Arguably, long distance usage may be mor_e
concentrated than local usage However, the point 1s that focus on the top 5% of users undereSII·
mates the extent to which usage 1s skewed. The fact is that a d1spropor11onate amount of the usage
(and revenues') are associated wnh a very small number of customer accounts. Far less than 5% of
the customers account for over half of local telephone company revenues, and this fact 1s _extr~me!y
1mponan1 for understanding the dynamics of market evolution An indication of the disparity 10
revenues 1costs associated wnh heavy business users vs. light residential users 1s seen m Table 3.
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TABLE3
SUBSIDY FROM HEAVY BUSINESS USERS
Top0.5 %
Customers

Access

Price($)

Co~t(Sl

40.12/line

12.50 or
20.00 line

Customer
'\lootb
100 line,

'\1ootbl)
S ub~id) (Sl

276::?.00 or
2012.00

Business
Usage

0.167, min

008 or
0 .13i min

5715 min

497 ~l or
171 45

Local Usage

0.00 min

0.01 mm

70'19 min

-70.99
3188 22 or
2112 46

Total
Sources Crandall (1991), Heyman. et ,ti (1987), OECD (1990). & Pa,anm Dl'tnbuuon

As can be seen. the combination of 0vercharged long distance usage and overpriced business
access (relauve to res1dent1al access) far exceeds the size of an} potenual cross-subs1d} .c.soc1a1ed
with local usage. TI11s accounts for the investment in alternative network.\ and bypass fac1lt11cs by
heavy users, and not for hght users It also accounts for the regulator} pressure exerted b} heavy
users for rate restructuring, as well as the resistance to such restructuring by light users.

REEXAMINATIO

OF LMS

The efficiency and equ1t} properties of LMS depend on the use to which nc-. I, demed LMS
revenues are put. There arc three ba\lc options (I) LMS revenues accrue as add1t1onal proltts to the
local exchange earner "'1th no ad1us1ment of other prices. {:!) revenue-neutral LMS. which lo....,crs
the monthly access charge in exchange tor local usage revenues; and (3) revenue-neutral LMS,
which lo-.crs long distance charges in exchange for local usage revenues.
Option (I) docs nothing 10 1mpro,e the ctt1c1ency associated with either access or long distance usage. It may improve efficiency in local usage prov1s1on and usage, but this 1s debatable in
light of much of the recent research. As capac1t} costs decline and usage related costs decline
towards zero, the sense of charging for usage becomes incrcasingl} unclear The equity properties
are even more ques11onable, since the existing cross-subsidy from heavy to light users will be exacerbated by LMS without any rate restructuring Pressures for bypass "Ill increase. It 1s unhkel~ that
either telephone companies or regulators would opt for 1h1s scenario.
Opuon (2) ....,ould gain more poh11cal support, since 11 provides a mean, for keeping month!}
access rates down It should be noted, however, that most voluntary LMS plans have low subscriptton rates, and these plans generally offer a reduced monthly access fee in exchange for local usage
sensn1ve charges. The efficiency properties are stm1lar to those m {I). S1m1larly, the extSting crosssubsidy from heavy 10 light users might actually increase with the 1mpos1tion of LMS, 1f the heavy
toll users are also the heavy local users To the extent that the two groups diverge, the ex1s11ng
cross-subsidy flow would be somewhat reduced.
It 1s optton (3) that, to us, provides the rationale for serious consideration of LMS. Even 1f
LMS were not efficient m 11.self (1.e., measurement coslS and welfare d1ss1pa11on due to intraperiod
variation in usage make fl at-rate pricing more efficient than LMS), efficiency might be enhanced
due to rate restructuring. The overpricing of long distance usage is meffic1en1 (Egan and Wenders,
1986) and leads 10 inefficient bypass and private provts1oning dec!Slons {Lehman and Weisman,
199 I). If LMS revenues are used to lower these inflated long distance prices, then efficiency and
equny may be enhanced. It may well be supenor to lower long distance usage charges by raising
monthly flat access charges (a continuation of the FCC policy already underway), but the pohtical
-39-
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resistance to such restructuring _is strong. If ii were feasible, then LMS should be evaluated on its
own ments and n?1 m com~10a11on w11h such res1ruc1urmg. Ho~ever, 11 1s the potential 1o facilitate
cost-based long distance pnces that gives LMS lls clearest ment. We suggest that it is on this basis
that the political debate should proceed.
LMS must be viewed as_a way 10 reduce the most serious cross-subsidies, n01 the fight 10
heavy local use subsidy B& fmd, which, 1f II exists al all, 1s 10consequen1ial relative 10 the long
distance 10 local subsidy and business to residential subsidy.

E D OTES
For example, see Koschat, Lehman, and Sieff (1986). They discovered a major data error in
the Rand report, resuhmg m its reissue.
' Baumol (I 986, pp.124-126) considers a more encompassmg defin11ion of cross-subsidy
which includes both types (anonymous cquuy).
'These are typical figures, for example, as reported in Boller, et al. (1984). For off-peak calls,
call set up costs are SO.OJ I with usage-sens1t1ve costs of $0.002,mmute
'The third re\.enue source, access lines, we exclude smce recent esumates md1ca1e they (residential access Imes) are pnced close 10 cost. Thus, no (or (111le) subsidy flow 1s associated with
them.
'The Pavanm d1str1bu11on states that, for res1den11al usage, 1f x1 1s the number of calls made
by the 11h consumer then xi • • .27 (xi raised to .27) will be normal wuh standard devia11on = .8 •
mean. For business usage the exponent seems to be .4 The plot of vector x should be very skewed,
loaded up near the ongm and very Ihm-tailed out to the ngh1 Hov.ever, the plot of x • • .27 should
look bell-shaped.
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